In the China context, diplomatic recognition and support in the United Nations tend to be mutually supportive acts. Accordingly, given the present trend in recognition, we can also expect increasing support for Peking in the UN which is likely to lead to PRC seating and GRC expulsion this year or in Our policy is being regarded more and more as unrealistic and out of date, both internationally and within the American body politic. We therefore have a moral obligation as well as political, economic and military interests arising from our long association with the GRC.
Thus important and valid but mutually incompatible interests of the United States in the China tangle have long presented us with dilemmas in our China policy. For most of the past two decades these dilemmas could be, and were, fairly successfully submerged, but developments of the past year have brought them into stark focus.
Can anything be done about it? What future course would be most promising? What are the confines of US policy maneuverability? What are the likely costs and benefits from moves within those limits? This paper examines the issues raised by these questions and presents policy alternatives relative to them. Before addressing these questions, however, certain strategic factors in the situation facing us should be noted. Strategic Factors. The Nixon Doctrine and the Asian reaction.
For years the US has deployed strategic and conventional forces in forward positions throughout East Asia. The presence of these forces has brought important gains in exchange for certain costs.
They have helped deter overt conventional military aggression by Asian Communist countries. They have added significantly to the confidence of allied governments in their ability to resist Communist domination and influence.
At the same time the presence of foreign troops to some extent has engendered frictions with local populations within the host countries, as well as with governments sensitive about what the presence of those troops implies for their sovereignty. The presence of US troops, particularly in mainland Asia, has also projected a threatening image of the US in the eyes of the Chinese and other Asian Communists, constituting one of the barriers in the way of improvement in our relations with them.
In accordance with the Nixon Doctrine the US is now reducing its close-in military presence which Peking has long cited as proof of US hostility and presumption and is increasing military assistance to selected allies so that they can assume primary responsibility for their own non-nuclear defense.
Indeed, reduction of US forces in other parts of East Asia without concomitant reductions on Taiwan could well be regarded by Peking as an indication of US interest in keeping Taiwan permanently separate from the mainland, as a US base directed against the PRC. The reduction of US force levels thus presents the US with political, military and psychological problems as well as opportunities. It has raised questions among our allies as to US determination to maintain its commitments, led them to start thinking more actively about how they might shape future arrangements with Peking, and may provide the PRC with opportunities to expand its political influence in the area.
The Chinese are and will continue to be deterred from overt massive aggression across their borders by US and Soviet nuclear and conventional power. Furthermore, Peking has seen benefits in what it regards as the over-extension of American resources and in the US domestic political disruption connected with the Viet-Nam War, and would like to see these continued—though not at the expense of an enlarged threat to China.
Any favorable PRC reaction toward the over-all reduction of US military presence in East Asia would be more than offset if the net effect should be strengthening the US presence on Taiwan.
As for reactions elsewhere, while some Asian leaders appear to have been reassured about US intentions and agree with the Nixon Doctrine as a practical approach if it is carefully implemented, many opinion makers are skeptical.
The media in Asia continue to reflect doubt and concern. Asian non-Communist nations in general continue to look upon the Chinese colossus with suspicion and fear. They fear the potential of Maoist-oriented Communist indigenous elements, particularly in view of the large Chinese minorities found in most Asian countries.
Conservative Japanese leaders are disturbed by the pace of US military force reductions and have hinted that we should slow down. Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia, Indonesia and to a lesser extent South Viet-Nam often express the hope for even greater American material assistance in strengthening their defense capabilities.
In the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand there is growing interest in contact with Communist states as a means of reducing tensions and protecting the peace and security of Southeast Asia, whereas Korea and Taiwan continue to oppose such contacts, preferring to rely on some kind of regional military arrangement as effective deterrence.
The latter may also be true in Cambodia and South Viet-Nam. Believing that the U. Although the text of this document was never made public, its basic thrust was later articulated in congressional testimony by Undersecretary of State Joseph J. As suggested by Sisco, this policy was aimed at both Iran and Saudi Arabia. In practice, however, the greater emphasis was placed on Iran.
This was so because Iran's armed forces were considered far more capable than those of Saudi Arabia, and because its leader, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was more attuned to U.
Indeed, Representative GerryE. Studds of Massachusetts went so far as to state that these transfers constituted "the most rapid buildup of military power under peacetime conditions of any nation in the history of the world. Although U. Facing a significant balance-of-payments crisis as a result of Vietnam War expenditures and the OPEC oil price increase of , the White House saw in military sales a practical means for recouping some of the massive dollar outflows.
Accordingly, U. So massive were U. These concerns were increased by reports that U. This report, and others like it, led Congress—for the first time since the s—to adopt significant legislative restraints on U. The AECA also required the White House to provide Congress with advance notice of pending arms agreements, and placed restrictions on the "re-transfer" of U.
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